In Q3 2018, the Fund gained 0.56% while the Russell 2000 (R2) gained 3.58% (as of 9/30/18).

Since inception (March 31, 2011), the Fund is up a cumulative 111.78%, the R2 is up 122.97%.

The AlphaOne Small Cap Opportunities Fund's objective is to achieve higher returns than the R2 with less volatility through active management. Through the years, the team has applied a consistent core (value and growth) process targeting companies that demonstrate earnings and earnings growth, return on capital and management that exhibits an ownership mentality. The Fund typically holds 50-70 domestic common stock positions and a targeted holding period of 3-5 years.

AlphaOne Small Cap Opportunities Fund (6/30/18) Annualized Returns	AOMAX	Russell 2000® Index	AlphaOne Difference
Trailing 1-Year	4.64%	15.24%	**-10.60%**
Trailing 3-Year	13.63%	17.12%	**-3.49%**
Trailing 5-Year	10.83%	11.07%	**-0.24%**
Inception-to-Date	10.52%	11.28%	**-0.76%**
Inception-to-Date (Cumulative Return)	111.78%	122.97%	**-11.20%**

The performance quoted herein represents past performance. Past performance does not guarantee future results. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate so that an investor's shares, when redeemed, may be worth more or less that their original cost, and current performance may be higher or lower than performance quoted. For performance data current to the most recent month end, please call 1-855-4-ALPHAONE. Gross Expenses for Small Cap Opportunities Fund Investor Shares are 1.52%. Returns do not reflect the effect of a 2.00% redemption fee which is incurred on shares held less than 90 days. The expense ratio does not reflect the ability of the Adviser to recover all or a portion of prior waivers, which would result in higher expenses for the investors. This option is available contractually to the Adviser until February 28, 2019. Other share classes are available, which would have different results.

Have you ever watched or participated in a lop-sided event? Like a football game (Alabama 66 vs Vanderbilt 3, 1979) or a lacrosse game (Hobart 37 vs MIT 1, 1980) or a debate (Lloyd Bentsen vs Dan Quayle, 1988). The emotional content to the opposing sides is as extreme as you can get. Winning and losing is an integral part of the human experience. However, the severe difference between the two emotions may bring outsized (and maybe premature) feelings of either elation or despondence.

Like the above cited events, investing is a game. A game of strategy. A game of preparedness. And yes, sometimes a game of luck. So, there are times when investors, even professionals, can find themselves on the extreme side of market behavior. Finding one's portfolio inclination on the wrong side of the investment wave can result in unpalatable relative returns.

To that point, the Russell 2000 (R2) has been pushed/pulled higher by the extreme bias towards either growth or value. We can measure this bias by dividing the Russell 2000 Growth (R2G) by the Russell 2000 Value (R2V). Over the past nearly five years we have witnessed three distinct waves within the R2. First, from 1Q14-3Q15 the R2G was in favor. Peaking at a 1.63 ratio. Second, from 3Q15-4Q16, the R2V was well supported with a ratio of 1.32. And third, from 1Q17-3Q18, the R2G may have peaked at 1.62. These lopsided biases within the R2 push active managers towards either winners or losers.

The Fund has been buffeted by these macro market actions. We are sorry to say that through and including 3Q18, we have been on the wrong side of this biased market. We are underperforming on a relative basis by 3.0% (3Q18) and 6.9% (YTD18). We are unhappy by this performance. We can place only so much blame on market action. We will continue to prosecute the investment style we have espoused for over two decades—investing in quality, well-managed, low leveraged companies with consistent above average profitable returns. We know that over time these companies provide both superior absolute and risk-adjusted returns.

We are stock pickers and even when our performance is good, we have chosen individual companies whose stock performance is problematic. To wit, half of YTD underperformance has come from three names plus cash. All three share the same problem, reduced earnings trajectory and visibility. We have reduced our exposure to two of the three (Invacare (IVC), PDF Solutions (PDFS)) and added to the other (RPC Corporation). We added to RPC due to the temporary nature of its earnings expectation decline. The temporary impairment was due to specific issues impacting takeaway capacity in the

Permian Basin. As this issue is resolved demand and prices for pressure pumping should rise driving increased earnings in 2019. Our decision to continue reducing exposure to IVC and PDFS is representative of our increased diligence to more quickly reduce the anchorage associated with companies experiencing the negative side of a company or industry's business cycle. The injurious price action of these companies in a rapidly rising market creates too much negative return leverage to the Fund.

With half of this year's underperformance due to internal factors, what external factors may be influencing our performance? The most obvious answer is the seemingly inexorable march from active to passive investing. The widening of this fund flow looks like a child's drawing of an alligator with the concomitant snapping pressure set poised to crush most active managers. To that point, through the end of 3Q18, small cap core manager outperformance stands at its low since the beginning of this great bull market with only around 20% of active managers beating the R2. This isn't to suggest small cap active managers have gotten less competent in their stock picking prowess (that is a debate for a different forum). Rather it is to suggest the outsized influence of passive investing has on the index (R2) we are judged against. In other words, as more money flows to passive and less to active, and more specifically, more money flows to passive funds focusing on growth, there is a compounding effect on stock selection within the index. By that we mean, the mechanics of ETFs, congregate their purchasing power in higher market capitalization (cap) names within the R2, R2G, and R2V. If we decompose absolute returns by market cap, by earnings, by ownership, we will see a bias towards higher market cap, low or no earnings, and high passive ownership. Active managers with a bias towards earnings, lower leverage (quality), and possibly some market cap constraints (this fund) find themselves at a distinct disadvantage when competing. Kind of like participating in a lop-sided game.

We all have been taught that there is always another game. In the investment game, we may say that means, there is a reversion to the mean. Value will have its day versus growth. High interest rates will supplant low interest rates. And active management will be in vogue versus passive. When will any or all of these occur, we can't say. However, we do know that over time that ownership of companies with low leverage, sound business models, good management, and above-average profitability provide superior absolute and risk-adjusted returns to shareholders.

We hope that migration towards that investing philosophy arrives soon. Until then we thank you for your support and patience.

Sincerely,

Daniel Goldfarb, CFA
Senior Portfolio Manager

Christopher Crooks, CFA
Senior Portfolio Manager

Disclosures

Top 10 holdings as of 9/30/2018 are Novanta, Inc.; Federal Signal Corp.; Enterprise Financial Services Corp.; Sterling Construction Company, Inc.; CalAmp Corp.; OceanFirst Financial Corp.; Healthstream, Inc.; U.S. Physical Therapy Inc.; Renasant Corp.; Inphi Corp. Top 10 holdings represent 23.16% of the portfolio. Holdings are subject to change. Current and future holdings are subject to risk.

Mutual fund investing involves risk including possible loss of principal. In addition to the normal risks associated with investing, investments in smaller companies typically exhibit higher volatility.

Information is obtained from sources deemed reliable, but there is no representation or warranty as to its accuracy, completeness or reliability. All information is current as of the date of this material and is subject to change without notice. Any view or opinions expressed may not reflect those of AOIS as a whole. This material represents an assessment of the market at a specific point in time and is not intended to be a forecast of future events or a guarantee of future results. Readers should not assume that any investments in securities, companies, sectors or markets identified and described were or will be profitable.

AlphaOne Funds are distributed by SEI Investments Distribution Co., which is not affiliated with AlphaOne Investment Services, LLC or any of its affiliates.

The Russell 2000® (R2) Index are a trademark/service mark of the Frank Russell Company. The Russell 2000® Index represents the smallest 2,000 companies within the Russell 3000® Index of the 3,000 largest U.S. companies.

VIX is ticker symbol for the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index, which shows the market's expectation of 30-day volatility. It is constructed using the implied volatilities of a wide range of S&P 500 Index options.

Zero interest-rate policy (ZIRP) is a macroeconomic concept describing conditions with a very low nominal interest rate, such as those in contemporary Japan and December 2008 through December 2015 in the United States.

Indices are unmanaged (R2); includes only U.S. companies; is market-value weighted; includes reinvestment of dividends; is shown for illustration only; does not reflex any management fees; and cannot be purchased directly by investors.

To determine if this Fund is an appropriate investment for you, carefully consider the Fund's investment objectives, risk factors, charges, and expenses before investing. This and other information can be found in the Fund's prospectus, which may be obtained by calling (855) 4-ALPHAONE. Read the prospectus carefully before investing or sending money.